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This paper investigates spatial variations in product prices using an exhaustive micro dataset on fish 
transactions. The data record all transactions between vessels and wholesalers that occur on local fish 
markets in France during the year 2007. Spatial disparities in fish prices are sizable, even after fish 
quality, time, seller and buyer unobserved heterogeneity have been taken into account. The price 
difference between local fish markets can be explained to some extent by distance, but mostly by a 
coast effect (analogous to a border effect in the literature on the law of one price) related to separate 
location on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. In particular, fish and crustacean prices are 34% 
higher on the Mediterranean coast. The law of one price is verified for almost all species when 
considering only local fish markets on the Atlantic coast. 
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A long-standing question in economics is the validity of the law of one price (LOP) which 
states that in an efficient market, all identical goods must have a unique price. This law has 
been investigated by studies assessing whether prices in several cities or countries converge to 
a common value using co-integration techniques (Asche et al., 1996; Parsley and Wei, 1996; 
Goldberg and Verboven, 2005; Fan and Wei, 2006). It has also been evaluated by articles 
assessing whether prices significantly differ for distant areas or when crossing an international 
border. The analysis has been carried out using either aggregate price indexes (Engel and 
Rogers, 1996) or, more recently, micro data on prices for identical products identified by their 
barcode (Broda and Weinstein, 2008). 
In this paper, we investigate the validity of the law of one price over space for transactions in 
a microeconomic perspective using panel data techniques. In contrast to the existing literature, 
we are able to control for spatial differences in buyers' preferences and in the production costs 
which may influence spatial differences in prices by modelling the unobserved heterogeneity 
of agents. 
We focus on the French fish market for which we have an original exhaustive dataset of first-
hand transactions. We assess whether significant spatial variations in fish prices can still be 
observed once the effects of observable fish characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity 
among agents have been netted out. As we compare the level of local prices, we are interested 
in testing the “absolute” LOP.2 We also examine whether the net difference in prices between 
two fish markets is linked to distance and a coast effect (analogous to a border effect) related 
to separate location on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. 
An originality of our work is that fish market prices can be considered as production prices, 
while other papers have focused rather on consumption prices for commodities sold in shops 
or supermarkets. Contrary to other studies, we are thus able to avoid the influence of 
marketing costs on prices – costs that are usually quite high and vary over space (Handbury 
and Weinstein, 2011).  
Interestingly, there is no inventory in fish markets and prices are set daily depending on the 
catches of the day. This limits issues related to inter-temporal decisions of buyers who may 
purchase large quantities infrequently to avoid shipping costs (Miljkovic 1999, Chiang et al., 
2001). Moreover, fish markets are spot markets and most buyers on a local market have 
information on all products sold locally, but also potentially on other markets through Internet 
                                                 
2 This is in contrast with papers comparing the evolution of local prices which rather test the “relative” LOP. See 
Broda and Weinstein (2008) for a discussion. 
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protocols (remote bidding) or simply by phone with distant representatives. But buyers still 
have to choose a fish market on the territory where they buy fish and incur transportation 
costs in case of a purchase. Because of these spatial frictions, the LOP is not guaranteed. 
In our estimations, we use exhaustive data on the whole national territory in contrast with 
other studies which consider unique locations. In particular, early studies on fish prices mostly 
used data collected in specific fish markets such as the Marseilles wholesale fish market in 
France (Härdle and Kirman, 1995; Vignes and Etienne, 2011), the Fulton fish Market in the 
USA (Graddy, 1995) or the Ancona fish market in Italy (Gallegati et al., 2011). 
Our work builds on recent advances in economic geography that focus on spatial wage 
disparities and estimate wage equations including both local fixed effects and individual fixed 
effects to take worker heterogeneity into account (Combes et al., 2008). This paper itself 
draws inspiration from the labor economics literature in which wage equations with both firm 
and worker fixed effects are estimated (Abowd et al., 1999). In the present article, we 
estimate some fish price equations that include three series of fixed effects related, 
respectively, to local markets, sellers and buyers.  
The model is estimated on a sample of one million transactions for seven fish and crustacean 
species in 2007. We first present some results for one species –monkfish – the species with 
the largest market share in our dataset, and then compare these results with those obtained for 
the six other species that differ from or are substitutes to monkfish. 
For our preferred specification for monkfish, we find that space matters, as local market 
effects explain around 14% of price variations. This result suggests that there is not a unique 
price on the fish market. In comparison, variables characterizing fish observable heterogeneity 
explain as much as 40% of price variations, while unobserved heterogeneity among vessels 
and buyers explain only a small share (6% and 3.5%, respectively). In particular, the 
heterogeneity among vessels captures the unobserved differences in fish quality related to 
differences in fishing techniques. As this heterogeneity only plays a minor role, it suggests 
that fish products are quite homogenously defined by their observable characteristics (size, 
presentation, quality grade) in our dataset.  
When replicating our approach for some other species, we find that results vary greatly across 
species. In particular, for hake, local market effects explain 41% of price variations. For 
squid, the corresponding figure is 27.5%, whereas fish explanatory characteristics explain 
only 4.3% of price variations. Overall, this suggests that results for a given product cannot be 




We also regress the absolute price difference net of composition effects between two local 
fish markets on the logarithm of distance, a dummy capturing the location on the two different 
coasts, as well as species dummies. Whereas distance only has a small effect, the coast effect 
is important. In fact, prices are 34% higher on the Mediterranean coast than on the Atlantic 
coast. The market segmentation between the two coasts can be explained by the prohibitive 
costs for boats of moving from one coast to the other, which can be done only by going 
around Spain and through the Straits of Gibraltar. Results by species show that prices are 
much higher on the Mediterranean coast for five out of our seven selected species.  
We also define groups of local fish markets such that, within each group, fish markets are 
well interconnected by mobile buyers and sellers. We consider that a group is well 
interconnected if, when restricting the estimation to transactions occurring within their group, 
three series of fixed effects (buyers, sellers and local markets) introduced in the price equation 
are all identified. We show that, for every species, there is a main group that includes most 
local fish markets on the Atlantic coast. For this group, the law of one price is verified for 
every species except hake and squid, for which it is close to being verified. Overall, this 
suggests that fish markets on the Atlantic coast are integrated. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our dataset along with some 
descriptive statistics on our sample. Section 3 explains our econometric approach and Section 
4 comments the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We assess the validity of the law of one price using transaction data from fish markets which 
are organized as follows. After landing, fish is weighed, sorted by presentation (whole, gutted, 
cut into pieces), size and quality, either by the crew itself onboard or by the harbor staff, and 
rated by decreasing order of quality. As emphasized by Kirman (2001, p. 157), the trading 
organization “varies from location to location, for little obvious reason”. Most of the fish is 
auctioned in trading rooms to which the fish is transported, or around the fish boxes in the fish 
hall with a mobile electronic auction clock mounted on a battery-powered vehicle.3 Only 
buyers and the auctioneer are present in the trading room – the fishermen return to sea or go 
home. 
In 2007, the year considered in our empirical analysis, 238,194 tons of fish valued at 705.5 
million euros were landed and traded in 40 local fish markets scattered along the French 
                                                 
3 For a full description of the electronic auction systems on fish markets in France, see for instance Guillotreau 
and Jiménez-Toribio (2006, 2011).  
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coastline.4 Figure 1 shows that most local fish markets are located along the Atlantic coast 
(including the Channel), and only a few of them along the Mediterranean. The three largest 
markets (Boulogne-sur-Mer along the Channel, Le Guilvinec and Lorient in Brittany) account 
for around one-third of total sales value. In fact, most of the large fish markets are located on 
the north-west coast. By contrast, all the fish markets along the Mediterranean are small.  
Our study of fish prices relies on a unique exhaustive dataset of transactions on the French 
fish market during the year 2007. In France, fish price data on every transaction are collected 
daily by the national bureau of seafood products (France Agrimer) from all fish markets and 
processed in a data system called RIC (Réseau Inter-Criées). The dataset comprises only a 
few variables, but they provide an accurate description of each transaction. 
The data include information on the fish market where every transaction takes place, as well 
as on the vessel and the buyer involved in the transaction. There are three distinct identifiers 
associated, respectively, with the local fish market, the vessel and the buyer. For the latter, the 
dataset includes the buyer’s license code, which is a market-specific account identifier. A 
buyer can have several accounts on one or more fish markets. To identify the buyers 
associated with the accounts, we rely on a complementary survey conducted in 2008 by 
France Agrimer which contains information on the official firm identifier for each account.5 
When matching this information with our dataset, we are able to identify the buyers for 85.3% 
of the accounts. 
Some information is also given for every transaction. We know the total price paid by the 
buyer along with the purchased quantity, from which we deduce the price per kilo. The 
dataset includes the month of the transaction but not the exact day, so the daily local fish 
supply cannot be considered in our analysis. We also know the type of trading system used for 
the transaction (auction or direct sales). Some additional details are given on the 
characteristics of fish exchanged during the transaction, such as the fish species, size, 
presentation (whole, gutted, in pieces, etc.) and quality (ranging from “extra” –the best 
quality– to low). 
The dataset includes 3,194,659 transactions when considering all species and all local fish 
markets. We restrict our sample as follows. Firstly, we only consider transactions 
corresponding to direct auctions between vessels and buyers on local fish markets. This 
                                                 
4 See http://www.criees-france.com/index.php?id_site=1&id_page=47 for further details. To the reported amount 
should be added extra fish directly exported to foreign countries or sold through domestic contracts (which 
represent more than 20% of sales). 
5 This is a nine-figure identifier attributed to each legal unit called the SIREN number. Each buyer is 
characterized by a unique SIREN number. The aim of the survey by France Agrimer was to match the SIREN 
numbers with the accounts registered on the fish markets. 
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eliminates 230,725 observations corresponding to direct sales to processors whose price is 
bargained very differently across time and space. Secondly, we remove 14,970 observations 
because the account identifier is missing. Thirdly, we focus on species characterized by a 
large number of transactions to avoid fish and crustaceans whose trade is limited to specific 
seasons or occurs only on a few local niche markets. More precisely, we restrict our analysis 
to the seven following species: monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), sole (Solea vulgaris), 
langoustine (Nephrops norvegicus), sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax), hake (Merluccius 
merluccius), John Dory (Zeus faber), and squid (Loligo vulgaris). 6 These selected species are 
involved in 1,009,788 transactions and represent about one-half of the total sales value.7 
On average, our selected species represent high-valued products. 
We now present some descriptive statistics on fish prices, fish characteristics and local 
markets for the seven selected species. The average fish price per kilo varies considerably 
across species, as shown in column 2 of Table 1. It is highest for sole (14 euros per kilo), and 
it ranges between 10 and 12 euros per kilo for John Dory, langoustine and sea bass. The 
lowest values are found for hake and monkfish (between 5 and 6 euros per kilo). Differences 
in average price between species reflect consumer tastes. Fish species like sea bass, John 
Dory and sole are considered to be high-quality products and they are bought by high-quality 
restaurants or consumers with high purchasing power.  
[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
For a given species, column 3 further indicates that the variation in transaction prices can be 
quite large. This variation is expected to be strongly related to differences in size, quality and 
presentation. The coefficient of variation is highest for hake and squid, with a value around .5. 
It is lowest for sole and John Dory, with a value around .35. 
As shown in column 4, fish species are all traded on more than 30 local markets (with a 
maximum of 37 markets for sole and sea bass), except for langoustine. This crustacean is only 
found in 17 local markets because only a limited number of trawlers, located mostly near 
Lorient, Le Guilvinec, Oleron and Concarneau, target langoustine under a specific license. By 
contrast, monkfish is caught all along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts by trawlers, 
                                                 
6 For the seven selected species, we exclude the transactions with missing information on size, presentation or 
quality (3,533 observations deleted). We further drop the .1% upper and lower values of the price distribution 
(2,002 observations deleted) and exclude, species by species, local fish markets with fewer than 100 transactions 
in 2007 (696 observations deleted). The number of local fish markets thus varies across species in our empirical 
analysis. 
7 Markets values are, in decreasing order, 69.1 million euro (M€) for monkfish (144,436 transactions), 68.6 M€ 
for sole (245,987 transactions), 44.8 M€ for langoustine (91,888 transactions), 46.4 M€ for sea bass (182,885 
transactions), 20.4 M€ for hake (196,950 transactions), 14.1 M€ for John Dory (54,113 transactions), and 29.2 
M€ for squid (93,529 transactions). 
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dredgers and gillnetters targeting other species as well. As shown in Appendix Table A1, only 
.4% of transactions occur on the Mediterranean coast for langoustine, compared to 10.5% for 
monkfish. The proportion of transactions on that coast is the highest for hake, at 28.1%. The 
average price varies considerably across local markets (column 5). The ratio between 
maximum and minimum local prices is highest for monkfish, with a value around three as 
shown in columns 6 and 7 (prices ranging from 4.3 to 13.4 euros). This ratio is the lowest for 
sole and hake (less than 2). 
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics on fish characteristics whose coding varies across 
species. For instance, there are five size categories for monkfish, but only three for sea bass. 
Concerning the presentation, all squid are traded as whole and langoustine are mostly sold 
alive (in 83% of transactions). Most monkfish transactions involve gutted fish, but monkfish 
is also sold as a whole or in pieces. Substantial differences in quality are observed across 
species. Most langoustine and, to a lesser extent, sea bass and sole, are characterized by the 
highest quality grade (Extra grade), while most monkfish and John Dory are of medium 
quality (B-grade). By definition, variations in any fish characteristic may potentially explain 
the variation in fish prices as long as the dispersion of fish across categories is large enough. 
[ Insert Table 2 here ] 
Table 2 further describes market conditions on local fish markets. The yearly average number 
of transactions per local market ranges from 1,691 for the scarce John Dory to 6,648 for the 
more common sole. There is substantial variation in the number of landing vessels, with more 
than 2,400 vessels for sea bass, but fewer than 400 vessels for langoustine.  
There are also differences in the numbers of accounts and matched buyers (i.e. the buyers that 
we are able to match to at least one account). However, these differences are smaller than for 
vessels. The average numbers of accounts and matched buyers are lowest for langoustine (912 
accounts and 538 matched buyers), this product being sold in only a few fish markets. The 
figures are larger for sole and sea bass with 1,900 accounts and 1,000 matched buyers per 
local market. The average number of transactions per buyer (ranging from 57 for John Dory 
to 195 for sole) is much higher than the number of transactions per account (respectively 40 
for John Dory and 129 for sole). 
Overall, our descriptive statistics suggest that there are large variations in fish prices across 
local fish markets and that many factors may influence price setting on these markets. We 
now propose an econometric approach to assess whether fish prices are mostly affected by 





3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Estimating local price indices 
For each fish species, we want to explain the log of the price per kilo, or unit price, of a fish 
quantity purchased by a buyer 𝑗 and sold by a vessel 𝑘 during a transaction 𝑖 in a local fish 
market 𝑐 occurring at month 𝑡. In that setting, the unit price of a transaction 𝑖 could be 
expressed as 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑐𝑡 to refer to the different dimensions. However, the buyer, vessel, local fish 
market and date can all be indexed by the transaction, so instead we use the notation 𝑃𝑖 for the 
log of unit price. 
We first try to explain prices with a set of observable fish characteristics 𝑋𝑖, time fixed effects 
𝜗𝑡, and fixed effects 𝜓𝑐 corresponding to the local fish markets where transactions take place. 
This specification allows to test for spatial variations in prices when holding constant the fish 
characteristics and fishing period. We consider that the absolute law of one price is verified if 
the dispersion of local market fixed effects is very small. We define a dispersion indicator as 
the ratio between the standard error of local market fixed effects (weighted by the number of 
transactions) and the average log-price. This indicator is much like a coefficient of variation. 
We consider that the law of one price is verified if our indicator takes a value lower than .05, 
which is usually considered to be a very small value for a coefficient of variation. Observable 
fish characteristics include size, presentation (whole, gutted, in pieces, frozen, etc.) and 
quality (freshness). These characteristics are expected to be strongly correlated with prices. 
We first consider the following specification for fish prices:  
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜓𝑐(𝑖) + 𝜗𝑡(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖        (1) 
where 𝑐(𝑖) is the local fish market where transaction 𝑖 takes place and 𝑡(𝑖) is the month in 
which the transaction occurs. This simple specification is estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares, and local fish market dummies and time dummies are introduced to recover, 
respectively, the local market fixed effects and time fixed effects. 
A limit of this approach is that it does not take into account the heterogeneity among buyers 
and sellers and this heterogeneity is captured by the error term. Estimation results are biased if 
there is a correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Biases related to buyer unobserved heterogeneity can occur because processors supplying 
high-quality restaurants need high-valued seafood products and may be ready to pay more 
than the average customer. Conversely, buyers working for secondary processing plants 
mostly purchase low-valued fish and may bargain harder on prices than other customers. 
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Moreover, some sorting of wholesale buyers may occur across local fish markets according to 
their willingness to pay because of specific local downstream markets. 
Biases related to vessel unobserved heterogeneity can occur because small vessels operating 
through short fishing trips essentially sell fresh fish in small lots at high prices. The largest 
trawlers spending one week or more at sea land frozen fish and may make discounts on large 
lots. There may also be some sorting of vessels across local fish markets according to 
production costs and fish quality because fishing gear used by vessels varies over space. 
In order to avoid biases due to these correlations, we add seller-specific terms 𝛾𝑗 and buyer-
specific terms 𝛿𝑘 to our price equation. Treating these terms as random effects would not 
allow to capture their correlation with observable fish characteristics and local market fixed 
effects. We therefore treat buyer and seller specific terms as fixed effects. Our price 
specification becomes: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜓𝑐(𝑖) + 𝛾𝑗(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑘(𝑖) + 𝜗𝑡(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖      (2) 
where 𝑗(𝑖) is the seller (the vessel in our context) involved in transaction 𝑖, and 𝑘(𝑖) is the 
buyer. We assume that the error term 𝜀𝑖 is not correlated with the observables and the various 
fixed effects. 
It is important to note that this specification includes non-nested terms as there may be some 
mobility of buyers and vessels across local fish markets. While small vessels are always 
expected to land their catches in the same market, it is likely that some of the largest vessels 
sell their catches in various places depending on their fishing location. Similarly, some fish 
buyers may purchase in only one fish market while others may purchase in several.  
We need an approach to estimate our model which includes four sets of fixed effects. As there 
are only 12 months in a year, and at most 37 local fish markets where the selected species are 
traded, time and local fixed effects can easily be taken into account with month dummies and 
local market dummies. We are left with two series of buyers’ and sellers’ fixed effects whose 
number is larger than a thousand for most species (see Table 2). Some methods to obtain the 
least square estimator of two non-nested very large sets of fixed effects were first developed 
by Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002) in a labor study using linked employer-
employee data. They are based on specific algorithms used to solve the first order conditions 
obtained when minimizing the sum of squared errors. Our number of fixed effects is not as 
large as theirs and we thus use more standard methods to estimate the model under alternative 
identifying assumptions, as explained below.  
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A particular emphasis is put in the literature on the necessary condition to separately identify 
the two sets of fixed effects. In labor studies, the condition is that there is enough mobility of 
workers between firms so that all firms are interconnected by mobile workers (Abowd et al., 
2008, Andrews et al., 2006). In our study, vessels are considered instead of firms and they are 
interconnected through customers purchasing fish from different sellers. Descriptive statistics 
show that the interconnection of vessels is good for all fish species. For instance, for monkfish 
which is our reference species, each account (resp. buyer) is involved in transactions with an 
average number of 18.2 vessels (resp. 27.2 vessels) during the year, as shown in Table 2. 
An additional difficulty in our study is that the specification also includes local market fixed 
effects that we want to identify separately from buyer and seller fixed effects. Without 
additional assumptions, some mobility of both sellers and buyers across local fish markets is 
necessary for identification. We can track buyers, but not accounts across local fish markets. 
This implies that additional assumptions are needed to identify the local market fixed effects 
when using accounts. We now discuss these additional identification assumptions. The details 
of the estimation approach are given in the appendix. 
 
The no-mobility case 
We first ignore the mobility of agents across local fish markets, assuming no mobility at all. 
This benchmark case will be useful to assess the importance of mobility in identifying the 
different sets of fixed effects. In this case, a vessel selling on 𝐿 local fish markets is treated as 
𝐿 different vessels.8 The account number is used as the buyer identifier on a given local fish 
market and this number is not tracked across local fish markets.  
In this setting, additional assumptions are needed to identify the local market effects. From 
specification (2), the local market fixed effect 𝜓𝑐 can be expressed as the average transaction 
price on that market net of the fish, buyer, seller and time effects: 
 𝜓𝑐 = 𝐸[𝑃𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝛾𝑗(𝑖) − 𝛿𝑘(𝑖) − 𝜗𝑡(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐]     (3) 
This expression can be rewritten as: 
𝜓𝑐 + 𝐸[𝛾𝑗(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑘(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐] = 𝐸[𝑃𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝜗𝑡(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐]     (4) 
As the mobility of agents across local fish markets is ignored, the average sum of the buyer 
and seller fixed effects on a local market cannot be separately identified from the local market 
fixed effect as shown by the left-hand side of equation (4). To guarantee the identification of 
                                                 
8 In practice, this amounts to consider the couple (local fish market, vessel) as the identifier for sellers instead of 
the vessel identifier alone.  
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the model, we assume that the average sum of the buyer and seller fixed effects on each local 
market is zero.  
A1. 𝐸[𝛾𝑗(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑘(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐] = 0 for each local fish market 𝑐. 
As the sum of the two fixed effects can be interpreted as a match between a buyer and a seller 
of a specific form, our assumption states that the average match on every local market is the 
same (and normalized to zero). This implies that the fixed effect of a given local fish market 
is the average transaction price on that market net of fish and time effects as shown by 
equation (4). The identification condition A1 is quite restrictive, but the model remains more 
attractive than specification (1) as it allows for a correlation between fish characteristics and 
buyer/seller fixed effects. In specification (1), the two sets of fixed effects enter the residual 
and OLS results are biased if their correlation with fish characteristics is different from zero. 
We need one identifying restriction on seller fixed effects and one identifying restriction on 
buyer fixed effects for each group of interconnected sellers and buyers. As the mobility of 
agents across markets is ignored, agents on different markets are not interconnected. One 
identifying restriction is thus needed for each set of fixed effects on each local fish market.9 
Once the seller and buyer fixed effects have been estimated (see Appendix), we center them 
with respect to their local market average. This makes the fixed effects comparable across 
local fish markets (Abowd et al., 2002). It also implies in our variance analysis that the 
variance of seller fixed effects and the variance of buyer fixed effects will be the intra local 
fish market variance. 
 
Mobility of sellers only 
We now take into account the fact that some vessels land fish in several fish markets. This 
may occur if vessels believe that some buyers are more willing to pay for specific products in 
some places, or if skippers have several fishing zones and land their catches in the nearest fish 
market to reduce transportation costs. In the case of monkfish, the percentage of vessels 
selling fish on at least two markets during the year is around 16.5%, which is significant but 
not large. This percentage has the same order of magnitude for other species, as it varies from 
13% to 24%. It is then useful to rewrite equation (4) as: 
𝜓𝑐 + 𝐸[𝛿𝑘(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐] = 𝐸[𝑃𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝜗𝑡(𝑖) − 𝛾𝑗(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐]     (5) 
                                                 
9 In practice, it sometimes happens that some sellers are not interconnected to others on a given fish market. In 
that case, one has to consider an identification restriction for each group of well-interconnected sellers. The same 
comment applies to buyers.  
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As there is no mobility of buyers across local fish markets, the average buyer fixed effects on 
a local market cannot be separately identified from the local market fixed effect as shown by 
the left-hand side of equation (5). To grant the identification of the model, we now assume 
that the mean of buyer fixed effects on each local market is zero.  
A2. 𝐸[𝛿𝑘(𝑖)|𝑖 ∈ 𝑐] = 0 for each local fish market 𝑐. 
Our assumption states that the average composition of buyers is the same on every local 
market (and normalized to zero). It implies that the fixed effect of a given local fish market is 
the average transaction price on that market net of fish, seller and time effects as shown by the 
right-hand side of equation (5). 
 
Mobility of both sellers and buyers 
In our previous estimations, accounts (specific to fish markets) were used to determine who 
purchases fish. We now rather consider buyers as they can be tracked across markets thanks 
to their identifier. Some fish markets will be considered as well interconnected if, when 
restricting the sample to transactions occurring on these fish markets, Assumptions A1 and 
A2 are not needed for identification when estimating equation (2).  Put differently, some fish 
markets are well interconnected if there is enough mobility of sellers and buyers across fish 
markets for seller, buyer and local market fixed effects to be all identified (provided one fixed 
effect of each series is fixed to zero as normalization). For a group of well interconnected fish 
markets, it is possible to test the absolute law of one price while taking into account the 
unobserved heterogeneity of buyers and sellers without any restriction on sorting across local 
markets. The determination of groups of well interconnected fish markets is detailed in 
Appendix. 
 
3.2. The role of spatial frictions in explaining spatial variations in prices 
As a final step, we assess to what extent spatial frictions explain differences in local price 
fixed effects. For that purpose, we consider the following bilateral framework. Let 𝜓𝑐,𝑠 denote 
the fixed effect for local market 𝑐 of species 𝑠 (where subscript 𝑠 has been reintroduced).  
Following Broda and Weinstein (2008), we want to explain the absolute price difference 
�∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠� with ∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠 = 𝜓𝑐,𝑠 − 𝜓𝑐′,𝑠 as a function of distance between local markets and a 
parameter capturing the fact that two markets are located on two different coasts, i.e. the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are two 
disconnected areas for the French fishing fleet, since the only maritime passage between them 
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is via the Straits of Gibraltar. In our sample, while as many as 32 local markets are located 
along the Atlantic coast, only 7 of them are located along the Mediterranean.  
We consider the following linear model: 
�∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠� = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln𝑑𝑐𝑐′ + 𝜔𝐵𝑐𝑐′ + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑐𝑐′     (6) 
where 𝑑𝑐𝑐′ is the distance in kilometers between fish markets 𝑐 and 𝑐′, 𝛽 is the elasticity of 
price difference with respect to distance, 𝐵𝑐𝑐′ is a dummy equal to one when one of the local 
markets 𝑐 or 𝑐′ is located along the Atlantic coast and the other is located along the 
Mediterranean (zero otherwise), 𝜔 is a parameter measuring the magnitude of the coast effect, 
𝛼 is a constant, 𝜇𝑠 is a species fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑐𝑐′ is an error term.
10 As we consider the 
transaction to be the unit of analysis, model (6) is estimated by weighted least squares where 
the weight is given by 𝑁𝑐𝑁𝑐′/𝑁2 with 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑁𝑐′ the numbers of transactions occurring in 
fish markets 𝑐 and 𝑐′ respectively, and 𝑁 the total number of transactions. As a robustness 
check, we also estimate regressions where the dependent variable is the squared difference in 
fish market fixed effects �∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠�2 instead of the absolute difference. 
 
4. Empirical results 
We now assess whether price differences exist between local fish markets once the 
heterogeneity among fish, sellers, buyers and months is netted out. We focus on the monkfish 
species which is ranked first in terms of sales value in France in 2007 and present the results 
for the specifications developed in the previous section. Results obtained when considering 
other species are discussed at the end of this section.11 
 
4.1. Spatial variations in prices for monkfish 
We first regress fish prices on local market fixed effects only. Results are reported in column 
1 of Table 3. They show large spatial variations in prices. The R² measuring the explanatory 
power of local fixed effects is large, with a value of 46%. We then assess to what extent these 
spatial variations in prices are due to spatial differences in fish characteristics.  
For that purpose, we add fish characteristics to our specification, as well as time fixed effects 
as controls, which leads us to equation (1). Inclusion of these additional terms divides the 
                                                 
10 Note that our specification is symmetric in 𝑐 and 𝑐′, which means that the difference between 𝑐′ and 𝑐 is 
redundant with the difference between 𝑐 and 𝑐′. As a consequence, we only consider differences for pairs (𝑐, 𝑐′) 
such that 𝑐 < 𝑐′. Also, we do not include additive local market fixed effects in specification (6) such as Imbs et 
al. (2010) because i) it is not consistent with a specification of price differences and ii) our goal is to evaluate 
differences across local markets and not to control for them in the right-hand side of (6). 
11 Detailed estimates for other species are available from the authors upon request. 
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variance of estimated local market fixed effects by more than three, from .053 (column 1) to 
.015 (column 2). An explanation of this decrease is the positive correlation between fish 
quality effects and local market fixed effects, which is equal to .36 for monkfish, indicating 
that high-quality products are most often sold on the most expensive markets. 
There are also variations in quality within local fish markets as the R² increases substantially 
up to 74%. The estimated coefficients of fish characteristics have the expected sign. Fish with 
the lowest quality is much cheaper with a price per kilo approximately 60% lower than fish 
with the highest quality. Also, fish sold in pieces (with cut-off heads) is significantly more 
expensive than whole fish as raw inedible parts have been removed. We add the fish quantity 
sold during the transaction in column 3. This additional covariate does not affect our previous 
results and does not improve the fit of the model.12 The estimated parameter of quantity has 
the expected negative sign: larger quantities are, on average, sold for a cheaper price per kilo.  
[ Insert Table 3 here ] 
Next, we introduce account and seller fixed effects following equation (2). Results assuming 
no seller mobility are reported in column 4 of Table 3, and results taking seller mobility into 
account in column 5. We obtain results very similar to those reported previously, in particular 
for the variance of local market fixed effects.13 This suggests that the fish market where 
vessels choose to land catches does not depend on the expected local price. It may rather 
depend on the location of the fishing zone, as landing fish close to this zone reduces transport 
costs. At the same time, the introduction of buyer and seller fixed effects leads to a significant 
increase of the R² value, from .74 to .80. 
To assess the importance of factors in explaining fish price variations, we perform a variance 
decomposition for equation (2) when taking seller mobility into account in the estimations. 
Results are reported in Table 4.14 For monkfish, space plays an important role as the variance 
of estimated local market fixed effects accounts for 13.8% of price variations. This shows that 
there is not a unique price on the fish market for monkfish and spatial frictions may occur. 
                                                 
12 For these reasons, as well as the potential endogeneity of quantity due to a missing variable problem (since 
fish availability can influence both its price and the size of fish lots), we choose to exclude quantity from our 
other specifications.  
13 It should be mentioned, however, that there are slight variations in the values and ranking of estimated local 
market fixed effects. The correlation between local effects obtained from specification (1) and specification (2) 
assuming no mobility (respectively taking into account vessel mobility) is .983 (respectively .855). 
14 We rely on the estimates obtained for the scenario with seller mobility to perform the variance decomposition. 
We prefer not to include quantity in the list of explanatory variables as this covariate is likely to be endogenous. 
Additional results (not reported) show that introducing quantity in the regressions has no effect at all on the 
variance decomposition.  
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The most important determinants of price variations remain fish characteristics. Size, 
presentation and quality account for 41.5% of price variations. 
Time, seller and account fixed effects play a lesser role, explaining, respectively, 6.4%, 5.7% 
and 3.5% of price variations. In particular, vessel unobserved heterogeneity does not matter 
much although it captures to some extent unobserved fish quality related to fishing gear and 
onboard fish storage. This suggests that conditionally on observable characteristics, monkfish 
is a rather homogenous product.15  
[ Insert Table 4 here ] 
 
4.2. Spatial variations in prices for other species 
We also conduct a variance decomposition of prices for each fish species.16 Results reported 
in Table 4 confirm that local markets play a major role for some species. In particular, space 
is a major determinant of prices for hake as local market fixed effects explain as much as 41% 
of price variations. The corresponding figure is also large for squid, with a value of 27.5%. By 
contrast, local markets play a minor role for sole, sea bass, and John Dory as they explain less 
than 10% of price variations (5.9%, 7.6% and 8% respectively). 
Fish characteristics play an important role, except for squid, for which they explain only 4.3% 
of price variations. This is not really surprising as there is not much variation in presentation 
or size for this species. Among fish characteristics, size is always an important determinant of 
the price per kilo. A lower price is usually associated with a smaller fish, although there are 
exceptions. For species like monkfish and sole, fish in the second largest size category is more 
expensive than fish in the first size category because it better fits certain market requirements 
(the size of portions). Whereas monkfish is more expensive in pieces than whole as the non-
edible raw material has been discarded, this is not the case for langoustine, for which cut-off 
pieces are mostly frozen tails whose value is lower than that of a whole live langoustine. 
The importance of time effects also varies a lot across species, mainly because some species 
are seasonal whereas others are not. Month fixed effects account for as much as 25.4% of 
price variations for squid, with catches varying a lot over the year and being largest in 
October and January. Time effects also have a large explanatory power for langoustine as they 
explain around 17.2% of price variations. The price is low between May and July when 
                                                 
15 We also find a large positive weight (17.5%) for the covariance between seller fixed effects and the effect of 
fish characteristics. A possible explanation is that seller fixed effects capture unobservable fish quality, and that 
observable fish characteristics are correlated with unobservable ones. 




langoustine are abundant, but it increases sharply in December as langoustine are more scarce 
and demand rises sharply at Christmas and New Year. 
Finally, vessel and buyer unobserved heterogeneity explain a sizable share of price variations, 
but their explanatory power is never very large. Seller fixed effects account for 14.1% of price 
variations for hake, but the corresponding value is lower for other species and never exceeds 
8%.17 Buyer fixed effects account for 11.4% of price variations for John Dory, but the 
corresponding value is 10% at most for other species, and even below 4% for monkfish and 
langoustine. 
 
4.3. The role of distance and coast effects 
We now assess to what extent spatial differences in fish prices net of composition effects are 
related to distances between local markets and the location on the Atlantic or Mediterranean 
coast.  
We regress the absolute price difference between estimated local fixed effects on the 
logarithm of distance between the corresponding markets.18 Data for species are pooled and 
results are reported in column 1 of Table 5. The effect of distance is found to be positive and 
significant. Adding a dummy indicating whether markets are located on different coasts 
(column 2) substantially decreases the marginal effect of distance, but it remains positive and 
significant. The effect of the coast dummy is also found to be positive and significant, 
suggesting that markets on the two coasts are not integrated. Adding species dummies to 
control for differences in price magnitude between species does not affect the results, as 
shown in columns 3 and 4. 
[ Insert Table 5 here ] 
When only distance is introduced in the specification (in addition to fish dummies), its 
coefficient is .067, which suggests that adding one standard deviation (258 kilometers) to the 
average distance between two fish markets (371 kilometers) leads to a variation in the price 
ratio between fish markets of 3.6%.19 This effect is sizable, but not large. Furthermore, it 
decreases significantly when the coast dummy is introduced in the regression since the 
                                                 
17 Hake can be targeted by vessels as different as trawlers, gillnetters and hand-liners, or harvested as by-catch by 
vessels targeting langoustine on bottom ground. Fish quality varies according to the type of fishing gear. Price 
variations of hake may thus be explained by seller fixed effects as unobserved heterogeneity in fish quality is 
captured by seller fixed effects. 
18 Results obtained when using squared differences of local fixed effects instead of absolute differences are 
reported in columns 5-8 of Table 6 for the full sample and in panel B of Table 7 for the various species. They are 
qualitatively similar and are thus not commented in the text. 
19 Descriptive statistics on the average and standard deviation of distances are given in Table A3 in Appendix. 
The percentage reported in the text is given by the formula 100*(((371+258)/371).067-1). 
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coefficient of distance falls to .027. In that case, adding one standard deviation to the average 
distance between fish markets leads to a variation in the price ratio between fish markets of 
just 1.4%.  
In fact, the coast effect itself is very large, at .177, which corresponds to a variation in the 
price ratio as large as 19.4%. Price differences between coasts can also be assessed by running 
a descriptive regression of the local fixed effects on a Mediterranean coast dummy and 
species dummies. As shown in Appendix Table A4, we obtain a coefficient of .294 for the 
coast effect and prices are thus 34% higher on the Mediterranean coast than on the Atlantic. 
This difference can be explained by the geographic separation of the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean coasts for vessels. Indeed, vessels wishing to move from one coast to the other 
could only do so by going around Spain and through the Straits of Gibraltar. In practice, 
vessels based in a port on one coast never make a trip to the other coast because costs are far 
too high.  
We report in Table 6 the results obtained by species for a specification including distance and 
a coast dummy. Results differ across species with the distance coefficient varying from a non-
significant value of -.021 for hake to a significant value of .081 for langoustine. However, 
even for langoustine, adding one standard deviation (237 kilometers) to the average distance 
between two fish markets (297 kilometers) leads to a variation in the price ratio between fish 
markets of only 5.1%. This suggests that distance effects are small.  
[ Insert Table 6 here ] 
We also find substantial differences for the coast effect, which varies from a non-significant 
value of .004 for sole to a significant value of .415 for hake. In fact, the coast effect is 
important for four species which are, in decreasing order of effect size: hake, langoustine, 
monkfish and squid. 
 
4.4. The determination and characterization of integrated markets 
We finally assess to what extent local fish markets are integrated. We determine the main 
group of local fish markets that are well interconnected by flows not only of sellers, but also 
of buyers, who are now tracked across fish markets using the buyer identifier instead of the 
account identifier. For this main group, we test the absolute law of one price.  
For monkfish, we are able to identify the buyer for 87.1% of the 144,436 transactions. The 
remaining observations are dropped from our sample. As shown in Table 2, each identifier is 
related to an average of 27.1 vessels during the year, which is larger than for accounts, for 
which the average is 18.2 vessels. This comes from the aggregation of several accounts for a 
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given identifier, with an average of 1.8 accounts per identifier. Note that this leads to a 
mechanical decrease in the number of buyer fixed effects. The percentage of mobile buyers 
purchasing monkfish on at least two local markets reaches 23.4%, which is higher than the 
percentage of vessels (16.5%). 
Table 7 shows for various species that there are several groups of well interconnected fish 
markets. For monkfish, there are exactly seven groups (column 1). The largest group, defined 
as the group where the largest number of transactions takes place, includes 21 fish markets, 
compared with 33 fish markets for monkfish in the full sample. Interestingly, most fish 
markets on the Atlantic coast are in this group, while fish markets on the Mediterranean coast 
are all in other groups. This reinforces our claim that Mediterranean markets and Atlantic 
markets are separated. 
[ Insert Table 7 here ] 
We then assess to what extent the absolute law of one price is verified. For that purpose, we 
assess whether our dispersion indicator defined as the ratio between the standard error of local 
market fixed effects (weighted by the number of transactions) and the average log-price takes 
a value lower than .05. 
As shown in Column 1 of Table 8, the values of the indicator obtained from estimates of 
equation (2) under assumption A2 when using all transactions (model A) and when using only 
transactions from all matched buyers (model B) are close (.071 and .069). Our indicator for 
monkfish decreases sharply to just .027 (model C) when restricting the sample of transactions 
to those in the main group of well interconnected fish markets. 20 Relaxing assumption A2 
does not change the results very much, as our indicator decreases to .025 (model D). This 
value is very small and suggests that the absolute law of one price is verified for monkfish 
when considering the main group of well interconnected fish markets, which includes most of 
the markets on the Atlantic coast. 
[ Insert Table 8 here ] 
Next, we repeat the analysis for the other species. Interestingly, Table 7 shows that the main 
group of well interconnected fish markets always mainly comprises markets located on the 
Atlantic coast. It does not include any market on the Mediterranean coast and this suggests, 
once again, that the two coasts are not integrated. As shown in Table 8, most transactions 
occur in the main group for every species. Our indicator computed under Assumption A2 
decreases when considering the main group for all species. The decrease is by far the largest 
                                                 
20 The sample restricted to the largest group comprises 110,642 transactions representing 88.2% of transactions 
from matched buyers. 
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for hake (from .246 to .094) for which the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts are not 
separated, in line with the regression results reported in Table 6. 
When relaxing Assumption A2, our indicator is quite stable for every species. The absolute 
law of one price is verified for most species. Indeed, our indicator is below .05 for monkfish, 
sole, langoustine, sea bass and John Dory. Even for squid and hake, it remains quite small, as 




In this paper, we test the absolute law of one price for several fish species using a unique 
exhaustive dataset on fish transactions occurring on the French fish market in 2007. An 
originality of our work is that we are able to take into account spatial differences in buyers’ 
willingness to pay and in sellers’ production costs by modeling the unobserved heterogeneity 
of agents. We estimate a price equation including observable fish characteristics as well as 
seller, buyer, time and local market fixed effects. Spatial variations in prices net of 
composition effects are captured by the variations of local market fixed effects. 
Our main conclusion is that the absolute law of one price does not hold for most of the 
selected fish and crustacean species when considering all local fish markets. A key reason is 
that fish markets in France are located on two separate coasts, the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean. Vessels cannot easily move from one coast to the other as this requires going 
around Spain and through the Straits of Gibraltar. This trip is never made to land fish as 
moving costs are prohibitive. When restricting the analysis to the main group of well 
interconnected fish markets which always comprises markets located along the Atlantic coast, 
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATION OF LOCAL MARKET FIXED EFFECTS 
 
We explain in this Appendix how to estimate equation (2) under alternative identification 
assumptions. 
 
The no-mobility case  
To estimate specification (2) under the empirical counterpart of assumption A1, we first 
center the observations with respect to their local market average. This transformation makes 
the local market fixed effects disappear, and we obtain:21 
Δ𝑃𝑖 = Δ𝑋𝑖𝛽 + Δ𝜗𝑡(𝑖) + 𝛾𝑗(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑘(𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖       (A1) 
where Δ denotes the operator centering variables with respect to their local market average. 
Interestingly, equation (A1) corresponds to the error component model described in Abowd et 
al. (1999). 
In practice, the simplest procedure to estimate (A1) consists in including seller and buyer 
dummies in (1) and estimating the model by OLS, one seller dummy and one buyer dummy 
being dropped on each local market for identification purposes. However, due to the large 
number of fixed effects, this procedure cannot be implemented because of computation limits. 
We therefore apply a within-account transformation to equation (A1) to make the buyer fixed 
effects 𝛿𝑘 disappear and estimate the resulting equation by OLS.  
Denote by ?̂? the estimated coefficients of fish variables, ?̂?𝑡 the estimated time fixed effects 
and 𝛾�𝑗 the estimated seller fixed effects. The estimated fixed effect of buyer 𝑘 can be 
recovered as the average of Δ𝑃𝑖 − Δ𝑋𝑖?̂?  − Δ?̂?𝑡(𝑖) − 𝛾�𝑗(𝑖) computed on the subset of 
transactions involving the buyer. The local market fixed effects are recovered as the empirical 
counterpart of the right-hand side of equation (4).  
 
Mobility of sellers only 
To estimate specification (2) under the empirical counterpart of assumption A2, we again 
center the observations with respect to their local market average. This transformation makes 
the local market fixed effects disappear, and we obtain: 
Δ𝑃𝑖 = Δ𝑋𝑖𝛽 + Δ𝜗𝑡(𝑖) + Δ𝛾𝑗(𝑖) + 𝛿𝑘(𝑖) + Δ𝜀𝑖      (A2) 
We use the same estimation procedure as in the no-mobility case. The only difference in the 
specification to be estimated is that dummies for vessels should now be centered with respect 
                                                 
21 The empirical counterpart of the expectation involved in assumption A1 is the empirical average computed 
using the subsample of transactions occurring on the local fish market. 
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to their local market average. The model is first projected in the within-buyer dimension and 
estimated using OLS. This step allows to estimate the effect of fish characteristics as well as 
seller and time fixed effects. The fixed effect of any given buyer 𝑘 can then be recovered as 
the average of Δ𝑃𝑖 − Δ𝑋𝑖?̂?  − Δ?̂?𝑡(𝑖) − Δ𝛾�𝑗(𝑖) computed on the subset of transactions involving 
the buyer. The local market fixed effects are finally recovered as the empirical counterpart of 
the right-hand side of equation (5). 
 
Mobility of both sellers and buyers 
Equation (2) can be considered directly in the estimation using local market dummies to 
recover local market fixed effects since the number of fish markets is small. Some 
identification restrictions are needed as fish markets are not all properly interconnected with 
buyers and vessels. 
We now explain how we introduce identification restrictions. First consider buyers and 
sellers. We define a group as a set of buyers and sellers including all the buyers having 
purchased fish at least once from a vessel of that group and all the vessels having sold fish at 
least once to a buyer of that group. A second group is introduced when there are buyers and 
sellers such that no buyer in the first group has ever purchased fish from a vessel of the 
second group and no vessel in the first group has ever sold fish to a buyer of the second 
group. Drawing on graph theory, Abowd et al. (2002) propose a simple algorithm to identify 
mutually exclusive groups. We implement this algorithm using the procedure developed by 
Andrews et al. (2006). 
Now consider our three series of fixed effects (buyers, sellers and local markets). We identify 
three different types of groups: groups of connected buyers and vessels, groups of connected 
buyers and local markets, and groups of connected vessels and local markets. We then 
combine these groups to define groups of interconnected buyers, vessels and local markets. 
Each tri-dimensional group is defined by a unique combination of buyer-seller group, buyer-
local market group and seller-local market group. For the various species, we find that there is 
one group which includes most of the transactions. The proportion of fish transactions in the 
main group is 87.9% for monkfish, 83.3% for sole, 84.2% for langoustine, 78.2% for sea bass, 
68.1% for hake, 90.0% for John Dory, and 79.8% for squid.   
For each tri-dimensional group, one local market fixed effect is normalized to zero. Otherwise 




The model is first projected in the within-buyer dimension and estimated using ordinary least 
squares. This step allows to estimate not only the effect of fish variables, and seller and time 
fixed effects, but also local market fixed effects. We then center the estimated local market 
fixed effects with respect to their mean in the tri-dimensional group such that centered local 
market fixed effects are comparable across groups. The fixed effect of any given buyer 𝑘 can 
then be recovered as the average of 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖?̂?  −𝜓�𝑐(𝑖) − ?̂?𝑡(𝑖) − 𝛾�𝑗(𝑖) computed on the subset 




Figure 1: quantity of fish landed in fish markets in France in 2007 
 
Source: Association des Directeurs et Responsables des Halles à Marée de France, 2007. 
Note: map constructed by Jérémie Turpin and Christine Lamberts (CNRS-LETG-Nantes-UMR 6554). Data are available 
online at the address: http://www.criees-france.com/index.php?id_site=1&id_page=49.   
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Table 1. Prices on local fish markets 
Fish species All fish markets Per fish market 𝑐 
        𝑁    𝑃�   𝜎(𝑃) 𝑁𝑐 𝜎(𝑃�𝑐) max(𝑃�𝑐) min(𝑃�𝑐) 
Monkfish 144,436 6.248 2.485 33 2.559 13.390 4.337 
Sole 245,987 14.079 4.956 37 1.971 19.642 10.801 
Langoustine 91,888 11.852 5.015 17 3.486 21.126 7.477 
Sea bass 182,885 12.172 5.306 37 2.266 19.439 8.461 
Hake 196,950 5.002 2.563 31 .754 7.377 3.787 
John Dory 54,113 10.484 3.621 32 1.819 14.034 5.382 
Squid 93,529 8.251 4.193 35 2.363 14.156 5.121 
Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: for a given fish species, 𝑃� is the mean price of all transactions, 𝜎(𝑃) the standard deviation and 𝑁 the total number of 
transactions. 𝑃�𝑐 corresponds to the mean price of all transactions for the fish market 𝑐, max(𝑃�𝑐) and min(𝑃�𝑐) are respectively 
the maximum and the minimum of 𝑃�𝑐, 𝜎(𝑃�𝑐) is the standard deviation of these mean prices per fish market. 𝑁𝑐 is the number 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample, by fish species 
Variables Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Description of the transaction        
Price (ln) 1.770 2.572 2.385 2.405 1.476 2.279 2.011 
Quantity (ln) 7.980 6.716 7.793 6.841 7.038 6.849 7.303 
Size   1 (large) .143 .191 .083 .248 .079 .120 .162 
  2  .175 .180 .346 .331 .192 .274 .212 
  3 .294 .179 .063 .420 .187 .342 .258 
  4 .224 .183 .508 .000 .250 .264 .221 
  5 (small) .164 .267 .000 .000 .293 .000 .148 
Presentation Whole .025 .461 .140 .778 .316 .242 1.000 
  Gutted .891 .539 .000 .000 .684 .758 .000 
  Pieces .084 .000 .030 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  Alive .000 .000 .830 .222 .000 .000 .000 
Quality  Extra (top) .398 .636 .851 .673 .593 .348 .503 
  B  .574 .337 .135 .300 .382 .642 .496 
  C (low) .028 .027 .015 .027 .025 .010 .001 
Description of the market        
Number of fish markets 33 37 17 37 31 32 35 
Number of transactions per fish market 4376.8 6648.3 5405.2 4942.8 6353.2 1691.0 2672.3 
Number of vessels 1306 2076 372 2449 1361 1185 1323 
Number of transaction per vessel 110.6 118.5 247.0 74.7 144.7 45.7 70.7 
Number of accounts 1644 1909 912 1897 1686 1366 1678 
Number of transaction per account 87.9 128.9 100.8 96.4 116.8 39.6 55.7 
Number of matched buyers 903 1021 540 1011 925 772 948 
Number of transactions per matched buyer 139.3 194.5 162.6 148.7 193.4 57.0 80.7 
Mobility        
% of vessels mobile among fish markets .165 .151 .234 .130 .189 .138 .135 
% of accounts among fish markets .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
% of matched buyers mobile among fish markets .233 .235 .213 .233 .253 .215 .204 
% of vessels mobile among accounts .887 .943 .960 .940 .935 .871 .901 
Number of vessels per account  18.2 26.2 17.8 25.1 24.0 12.9 14.1 
% of vessels mobile among matched buyers .896 .936 .961 .935 .939 .873 .895 
Number of vessels per matched buyer 27.1 38.6 26.9 37.2 37.2 18.7 19.6 
Total number of transactions 144,436 245,987 91,888 182,885 196,950 54,113 93,529 
  Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
 




 Table 3. Estimates of the log price of monkfish 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Size   2  .037*** .037*** .032*** .032*** 
(ref: 1 Large)  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
  3  -.088*** -.086*** -.090*** -.090*** 
  (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
  4  -.122*** -.122*** -.130*** -.130*** 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
  5 (Small)  -.240*** -.241*** -.257*** -.258*** 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Presentation Gutted  -.143*** -.142*** -.192*** -.192*** 
(ref: Whole)  (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
  Pieces  .590*** .583*** .454*** .460*** 
  (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Quality  B  -.044*** -.035*** -.018*** -.017*** 
(ref: Extra)  (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
  C (Low)  -.550*** -.550*** -.512*** -.511*** 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Quantity (ln)   -.006***   
   (.000)   
Monthly fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Seller fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Mobility of sellers NO NO NO NO YES 
Account fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Fish market fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Variance of fish market fixed effects .053 .015 .015 .017 .016 
Correlation of fish market fixed effects 1.000 .671*** .668*** .773*** .400*** 
  1.000 .999*** .984*** .908*** 
   1.000 .983*** .912*** 
    1.000 .855*** 
     1.000 
Number of observations 144,436 144,436 144,436 144,436 144,436 
R² .458 .743 .743 .798 .796 
Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: (1), (2) and (3) are estimates from OLS models, (4) and (5) are estimates from fixed effect models. Standard errors are 
in parentheses, significance levels being respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The variance of fish market fixed 





Table 4. Variance decomposition of the log fish price at the transaction level for the seller and account fixed effect model, by fish species 
Decomposition Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid  
Var(size + presentation + quality) .0476 41.5% .0591 36.2% .0830 45.1% .0530 27.0% .1270 45.2% .0540 32.4% .0079 4.3% 
Var(monthly FE) .0074 6.4% .0066 4.0% .0316 17.2% .0287 14.7% .0083 2.9% .0109 6.6% .0468 25.4% 
Var(seller FE) .0065 5.7% .0105 6.4% .0114 6.2% .0134 6.8% .0397 14.1% .0129 7.8% .0104 5.7% 
Var(account FE) .0040 3.5% .0160 9.8% .0045 2.5% .0158 8.0% .0280 10.0% .0190 11.4% .0148 8.0% 
Var(fish market FE) .0159 13.8% .0097 5.9% .0304 16.5% .0149 7.6% .1151 41.0% .0134 8.0% .0506 27.5% 
2*Cov(size + presentation + quality ; monthly FE) -.0013 -1.1% -.0014 -.9% -.0001 -.1% .0050 2.6% .0028 1.0% -.0015 -.9% -.0040 -2.2% 
2*Cov(size + presentation + quality ; seller FE) .0201 17.5% .0013 .8% .0058 3.1% .0132 6.7% .0195 6.9% .0037 2.2% .0022 1.2% 
2*Cov(size + presentation + quality ; account FE) -.0004 -.4% .0066 4.0% .0039 2.1% .0066 3.4% .0140 5.0% .0058 3.5% .0014 .8% 
2*Cov(size + presentation + quality ; fish market FE) -.0048 -4.2% -.0038 -2.3% -.0089 -4.8% -.0033 -1.7% -.0999 -35.6% -.0013 -.8% .0129 7.0% 
2*Cov(monthly FE ; seller FE) -.0006 -.5% .0001 .1% -.0020 -1.1% .0042 2.2% .0005 .2% -.0003 -.2% -.0016 -.8% 
2*Cov(monthly FE ; account FE) .0003 .3% .0006 .4% .0016 .9% .0020 1.0% .0009 .3% .0005 .3% .0048 2.6% 
2*Cov(monthly FE ; fish market FE) -.0002 -.1% -.0002 -.1% .0023 1.2% -.0031 -1.6% .0016 .6% -.0002 -.1% -.0101 -5.5% 
2*Cov(seller FE ; account FE) .0005 .4% .0012 .8% .0004 .2% .0022 1.1% .0062 2.2% .0026 1.6% .0017 .9% 
2*Cov(seller FE ; fish market FE) -.0036 -3.2% -.0046 -2.8% -.0247 -13.4% -.0066 -3.4% -.0776 -27.6% -.0096 -5.8% -.0073 -4.0% 
2*Cov(account FE ; fish market FE) .0000 .0% .0000 .0% .0000 .0% .0000 .0% .0000 .0% .0000 .0% .0000 .0% 
Var(residual) .0235 20.4% .0616 37.7% .0447 24.3% .0499 25.5% .0951 33.8% .0566 34.0% .0536 29.1% 
Var(gross price) .1148 .1634 .1839 .1961 .2810 .1665 .1842 
Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: the variance decomposition is based on estimates for the various species reported in Table A2 in appendix. FE stands for fixed effects.
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Table 5. Estimates of the price dispersion between fish markets 
Variables Absolute price difference �∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠� Squared price difference �∆𝜓𝑐𝑐′,𝑠�2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -.140*** .048* -.222*** -.058* -.142*** .008 -.176*** -.050** 
 (.032) (.025) (.034) (.030) (.026) (.017) (.027) (.020) 
Distance in kilometers (log) .062*** .017*** .067*** .027*** .041*** .006 .042*** .011*** 
 (.006) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.003) (.005) (.004) 
Coast effect 
 
.197***  .177*** 
 
.158***  .135*** 
  
(.022)  (.016) 
 
(.020)  (.014) 
Fish species Sole 
 
 -.034*** -.026*** 
 
 -.035*** -.029*** 
(ref : Monkfish) 
 
 (.012) (.009) 
 
 (.006) (.005) 
  Langoustine 
 
 .148*** .153*** 
 
 .068*** .072*** 
  
 (.028) (.031) 
 
 (.015) (.017) 
  Sea bass 
 
 -.015 -.014* 
 
 -.025*** -.024*** 
  
 (.012) (.008) 
 
 (.006) (.005) 
  Hake 
 
 .213*** .194*** 
 
 .189*** .174*** 
  
 (.030) (.025) 
 
 (.030) (.027) 
  John Dory 
 
 .007 .012 
 
 -.008 -.004 
  
 (.014) (.009) 
 
 (.007) (.004) 
  Squid 
 
 .095*** .101*** 
 
 .047*** .051*** 
  
 (.016) (.012) 
 
 (.010) (.007) 
Number of observations 3552 3552 3552 3552 3552 3552 3552 3552 
R² .126 .236 .308 .395 .079 .178 .258 .330 
Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: Specifications are estimated by weighted least squares where the weight for an observation involving fish markets 𝑐 and 𝑐′ is given by 𝑁𝑐𝑁𝑐′/𝑁2 where 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑁𝑐′ are the numbers of 
transactions occurring on fish markets 𝑐 and 𝑐′ respectively, and 𝑁 is the total number of transactions. Standard errors robust with respect to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses, 










Table 6. Estimates of the price dispersion between fish markets, by fish species 
A/ Dependent variable: Absolute price difference �∆𝝍𝒄𝒄′,𝒔� 
Variables Monkfish Sole Langous- 
tine 
Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Constant .049*** .010 -.138* .054** .305** .020 .049 
 (.013) (.024) (.079) (.027) (.146) (.029) (.050) 
Distance in kilometers (log) .000 .019*** .081*** .007 -.021 .017*** .022** 
 (.003) (.005) (.018) (.005) (.027) (.006) (.009) 
Coast effect .311*** .004 .346*** .131*** .415*** .088*** .246*** 
 (.013) (.013) (.080) (.013) (.058) (.018) (.028) 
Number of observations 528 666 136 666 465 496 595 
R² .747 .047 .461 .332 .317 .192 .373 
 
B/ Dependent variable: Squared price difference �∆𝝍𝒄𝒄′,𝒔�𝟐 
Variables Monkfish Sole Langous-
tine 
Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Constant -.002 -.008 -.106*** -.006 .202 -.009 .001 
 (.004) (.006) (.037) (.008) (.138) (.011) (.027) 
Distance in kilometers (log) .002** .005*** .040*** .004** -.025 .006*** .009* 
 (.001) (.001) (.009) (.002) (.025) (.002) (.005) 
Coast effect .135*** .002 .441*** .047*** .424*** .028*** .187*** 
 (.007) (.004) (.101) (.006) (.059) (.007) (.019) 
Number of observations 528 666 136 666 465 496 595 
R² .591 .041 .439 .223 .302 .095 .382 
Source: RIC 2007. 
Note: Specifications are estimated by weighted least squares where the weight for an observation involving fish markets 𝑐 
and 𝑐′ is given by 𝑁𝑐𝑁𝑐′/𝑁2 where 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑁𝑐′ are the numbers of transactions occurring on fish markets 𝑐 and 𝑐’, and 𝑁 is 
the total number of transactions. Standard errors robust with respect to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses, 
significance levels being respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The fish market fixed effects are based on estimates 








Table 7. Composition of well interconnected groups of fish markets, by species 
Group (by decreasing size) Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Group 1 Nb of fish markets 21 25 10 25 20 20 22 
 List of fish markets AC - AD - CC - 
CH - CR - EQ - GL 
- GR - GV - IO - 
LC - LN - LO - LS 
- NO - RO - SG - 
SJ - SQ - TB - YE 
AC - AD - BL - CC 
- CH - CR - DP - 
EQ - FP - GL - GR 
- GV - IO - LC - 
LN - LO - LS - NO 
- RO - RY - SG - 
SJ - SQ - TB - YE 
CC - CR - EQ - GV 
- LC - LN - LO - 
LS - SG - TB 
AC - AD - BL - CC 
- CH - CR - DP - 
EQ - FP - GL - GR 
- GV - IO - LC - 
LN - LO - LS - NO 
- RO - RY - SG - 
SJ - SQ - TB - YE 
AC - CC - CH - CR 
- EQ - GL - GV - 
IO - LC - LN - LO 
- LS - NO - RO - 
RY - SG - SJ - SQ - 
TB - YE 
AC - AD - BL - CC 
- CH - CR - EQ - 
GR - GV - IO - LC 
- LN - LO - LS - 
RO - SG - SJ - SQ - 
TB - YE 
AC - BL - CC - CH 
- CR - DP - EQ - 
GL - GR - GV - IO 
- LC - LN - LO - 
LS - NO - RO - RY 
- SG - SJ - SQ - TB 
Group 2 Nb of fish markets 2 4 1 5 6 3 3 
 List of fish markets AG*  - ST*  AG*  - PN*  -  PB*  
- ST*  
IO  AG*  - PN* - PB*  - 
PV* - ST*  
34*  - AG*  - PN*  - 
PB* - PV*  - ST*  
AG*  - PN* - PB*  AG*  - PN* - PB*  
Group 3 Nb of fish markets 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 List of fish markets PN* - PB*  PV*  RY  GO*  GO*  GO*  GO*  
Group 4 Nb of fish markets 1 1 1  1 1 1 
 List of fish markets GO*  GO*  AG*   AD  PV*  ST*  
Group 5 Nb of fish markets 1  1   1 1 
 List of fish markets PV*   ST*    ST*  PV*  
Group 6 Nb of fish markets 1  1   1 1 
 List of fish markets RY   SJ    DP  FP  
Group 7 Nb of fish markets 1       
 List of fish markets DP        
Number of fish markets 29 31 15 31 28 27 29 
Number of groups 7 4 6 3 4 6 6 
Source: RIC 2007. 
Note: List of fish markets, by location. * indicates locations on the Mediterranean coast.  
Atlantic. AC : Arcachon - AD : Audierne - BL : Boulogne - CC: Concarneau - CH: Cherbourg - CR : Le Croisic - DP : Dieppe - EQ : Erquy - FP : Fécamp - GL : Saint-Gilles Croix-de-Vie - 
GR: Granville - GV : Le Guilvinec - IO : Oléron - LC : Loctudy - LN : Lesconil - LO : Lorient - LS : Les Sables d'Olonne - NO : Noirmoutier - RO : Roscoff - RY : Royan - SG : Saint Guénolé 
- SJ : Saint-Jean de Luz - SQ : Saint Quay Portrieux - TB : La Turballe - YE : Ile d'Yeu.  






Table 8. Variance of local market fixed effects, by species and specification 
Specification Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Model A. All transactions - specification: mobility of sellers only 
Control variables: fish characteristics + monthly FE + seller FE (with mobility of sellers) + account FE + local market FE 
Number of transactions 144,436 245,987 91,888 182,885 196,950 54,113 93,529 
Variance of local market FE  .0159 .0097 .0304 .0149 .1151 .0131 .0506 
% in total variance 13.8% 5.9% 16.5% 7.6% 41.0% 8.0% 26.9% 
𝜎(𝑃)/m (𝑃) .1915 .1571 .1798 .1841 .3592 .1791 .2155 
𝜎(Local market FE)/m(𝑃) .0712 .0383 .0731 .0508 .2298 .0508 .1118 
Number of local markets 33 37 17 37 31 32 35 
Model B. Transactions from all matched buyers - specification: mobility of sellers only  
Control variables: fish characteristics + monthly FE + seller FE (with mobility of sellers) + account FE + local market FE 
Number of transactions 125,831 198,564 87,819 150,356 178,938 44,019 76,470 
Variance of local market FE .0150 .0082 .0143 .0157 .1325 .0121 .0522 
% in total variance 13.8% 5.2% 7.8% 7.8% 47.0% 7.8% 27.1% 
𝜎(𝑃)/m (𝑃) .1871 .1537 .1802 .1865 .3586 .1719 .2173 
𝜎(Local market FE)/m (𝑃) .0694 .0351 .0503 .0521 .2457 .0479 .1131 
Number of local markets 29 31 15 31 28 27 29 
Number of groups of well-interconnected local markets 7 4 6 3 4 6 6 
Model C. Transactions from matched buyer, restriction to the most important group of local markets - specification: mobility of sellers only  
Control variables: fish characteristics + monthly FE + seller FE (with mobility of sellers) + account FE + local market FE 
Number of transactions 110,642 165,340 73,922 117,614 121,809 39,631 60,999 
Variance of local market FE .0021 .0080 .0083 .0064 .0176 .0104 .0149 
% in total variance 2.1% 6.2% 4.7% 3.6% 5.0% 7.4% 11.1% 
𝜎(𝑃)/m(𝑃) .1843 .1408 .1747 .1789 .4206 .1638 .1910 
𝜎(Local market FE)/m (𝑃) .0266 .0350 .0380 .0339 .0944 .0446 .0637 
Number of local markets 21 25 10 25 20 20 22 
Number of groups of well-interconnected local markets 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Model D. Transactions from matched buyers, restriction to the most important group of local markets - specification: mobility of buyers and sellers 
Control variables: fish characteristics + monthly FE + seller FE (with mobility of sellers) + buyer FE (with mobility of buyers) + local market FE 
Number of transactions 110,642 165,340 73,922 117,614 121,809 39,631 60,999 
Variance of local market FE .0019 .0109 .0078 .0044 .0197 .0127 .0167 
% in total variance 1.9% 8.5% 4.5% 2.4% 5.6% 9.1% 12.5% 
𝜎(𝑃)/m (𝑃) .1843 .1408 .1747 .1789 .4206 .1638 .1910 
𝜎(Local market FE)/m(𝑃) .0252 .0409 .0370 .0279 .0996 .0494 .0676 
Number of local markets 21 25 10 25 20 20 22 
Number of groups of well-interconnected local markets 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: RIC 2007. 
Note: 𝑃 is the logarithm of transaction unit price, 𝑚(𝑃) is its average and 𝜎(𝑃) is its standard error. FE stands for fixed effect. 𝜎(Local market FE) is the standard error of local market fixed 








Table A1. Proportion of transactions occurring on each fish market 




Contribution to total transaction per fish species 





 AC : Arcachon 1,102.5 25,872 1.6 4.1  2.9 2.6 0.4 2.9 
AD : Audierne 319.2 10,907 1.8 0.4  3.6 0.2 0.8  
BL : Boulogne 1,206.4 15,497  1.6  2.9  0.5 6.4 
CC: Concarneau 2,327.2 54,177 7.3 3.7 13.4 2.5 6.8 4.9 1.9 
CH: Cherbourg 805.9 20,215 1.8 2.2  4.0 0.1 2.9 3.1 
CR : Le Croisic 770.6 35,467 2.0 4.8 3.7 2.9 3.7 3.3 3.3 
DK : Dunkerque 374.4 6,372  2.2  0.5   0.2 
DP : Dieppe 185.4 3,578 0.1 0.5  0.6  0.7 0.7 
EQ : Erquy 1,902.4 30,865 5.7 2.3 0.2 2.3 1.6 7.0 6.2 
FP : Fécamp 188.2 3,792  1.3  0.3   0.2 
GD : Grandcamp 138.7 7,256  1.8  1.0  0.4 1.0 
GL : Saint-Gilles Croix-de-Vie 513.6 8,586 0.1 0.8  1.9 1.2  0.7 
GR: Granville 153.6 11,823 0.8 2.8  0.6  1.1 2.1 
GV : Le Guilvinec 6,961.4 91,265 21.1 3.9 16.3 3.0 6.7 20.0 7.3 
IO : Oléron 1,776.0 76,282 4.4 8.4 14.3 6.5 7.6 3.6 7.8 
LC : Loctudy 2,512.3 31,221 4.7 2.0 9.7 1.0 2.7 4.4 1.3 
LN : Lesconil 183.0 6,856 0.9 0.6 2.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 
LO : Lorient 2,242.0 102,704 8.9 10.3 27.2 4.6 11.5 9.6 3.7 
LR : La Rochelle 928.6 24,716 0.9 3.3 0.8 2.9 2.6 1.7 3.3 
LS : Les Sables d'Olonne 1,870.8 48,502 2.9 7.8 1.4 5.5 4.3 3.3 3.8 
NO : Noirmoutier 679.6 15,204 0.6 2.3  3.5 1.1  0.3 
PO : Port-en-Bessin 250.7 24,179 1.8 1.7  3.1 3.4 2.4 4.0 
QB : Quiberon 213.3 14,116 0.6 1.1 0.3 4.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 
RO : Roscoff 1,278.5 17,877 4.9 0.6  2.2 0.7 3.9 1.8 
RY : Royan 310.1 6,980 0.1 1.0 0.3 1.7 0.4  0.2 
SG : Saint Guénolé 1,970.2 40,581 5.8 2.7 9.5 2.7 3.0 6.0 2.7 
SJ : Saint-Jean de Luz 447.1 18,730 1.1 1.5 0.2 1.8 3.9 1.2 1.8 
SM : Saint-Malo 30.2 2,171 0.2 0.4  0.1  0.2 0.7 
SQ : Saint Quay Portrieux 1,431.1 41,042 6.5 4.6  2.9 1.2 7.0 9.6 
TB : La Turballe 1,203.6 36,639 1.9 2.9 0.2 6.8 4.1 3.9 4.3 
YE : Ile d'Yeu 682.4 12,544 0.8 1.4  3.1 1.1 0.2  







 34 : Copemart 13.6 117     0.1   
AG : Agde 281.3 27,380 2.4 2.7 0.1 2.7 4.4 1.0 3.3 
GO : Le Grau du Roi 476.2 49,248 1.1 5.1  7.4 7.7 1.1 6.1 
PB : Port de Bouc 589.2 15,769 0.8 2.3  1.9 0.1 3.6 3.5 
PN : Port La Nouvelle 273.6 21,872 1.5 2.1  2.1 4.0 0.8 2.5 
PV : Port Vendres 67.3 4,227 0.3 0.3  0.3 1.0 0.2 0.6 
ST : Sète 843.4 45,159 4.3 2.9 0.3 3.9 10.9 3.0 1.5 
All Mediterranean markets 2,544.4 163,772 10.5 15.4 0.4 18.3 28.1 9.7 17.5 
All fish markets 37,503.6 1,009,788 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




Table A2. Estimates of the log price of selected species 
Variables Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Size   2 .032*** .058*** -.429*** -.255*** -.263*** -.154*** .114*** 
(ref: 1 Big) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.003) 
  3 -.090*** -.076*** -.496*** -.438*** -.564*** -.321*** .081*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.003) 
  4 -.130*** -.233*** -.846***  -.881*** -.660*** -.003 
 (.002) (.002) (.003)  (.004) (.004) (.003) 
  5 (Small) -.258*** -.517***   -1.024***  -.189*** 
 (.002) (.002)   (.004)  (.003) 
Presentation Gutted -.192*** .007   .262*** .052***  
(ref: Entire) (.006) (.004)   (.016) (.011)  
  Cut off .460***  -.212***     
 (.007)  (.005)     
  Alive   .264***     
   (.005)     
  Fishing line    .177***    
    (.004)    
Quality  B -.017*** -.057*** -.107*** -.105*** -.071*** -.012** -.112*** 
(ref: Extra) (.002) (.003) (.008) (.002) (.003) (.005) (.004) 
  C (Low) -.511*** -.571*** -1.184*** -.679*** -.570*** -.679*** -1.209*** 
 (.003) (.004) (.011) (.004) (.006) (.013) (.024) 
Monthly fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Seller fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mobility of sellers YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Account fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fish market fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Variance of fish market fixed effects .016 .010 .030 .015 .115 .013 .051 
Number of observations 144,436 245,987 91,888 182,885 196,950 54,113 93,529 
R² .796 .623 .757 .745 .662 .660 .715 
Source: RIC 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Note: estimates from fixed effect models. Standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels being respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).The variance of fish market fixed effects is 






Table A3. Distance between fish markets (in kilometers) 
Variables Monkfish Sole Langoustine Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid All 
All pairs of fish markets         
 Average distance 370.9 392.0 297.2 392.0 385.8 396.7 400.5 386.5 
 Standard deviation 258.3 256.1 236.5 256.1 271.7 267.2 257.1 260.1 
Fish markets: both on Atlantic coast         
 Average distance 233.1 273.7 198.4 273.7 219.2 255.7 279.0 256.6 
 Standard deviation 144.8 170.0 143.6 170.0 140.0 162.6 171.8 163.1 
Fish markets: both on Mediterranean coast         
 Average distance 92.3 92.3 21.0 92.3 96.6 92.3 92.3 92.5 
 Standard deviation 46.8 46.8 - 46.8 51.8 46.8 46.8 47.1 
Fish markets: one Atlantic, one Mediterranean          
 Average distance 695.4 711.8 652.1 711.8 695.7 719.7 710.5 706.0 
 Standard deviation 134.3 133.8 135.1 133.8 139.7 129.8 135.0 134.7 





Table A4. Regression of fish market fixed effects on a dummy for being on the Mediterranean coast 
Variables All fish species Monkfish Sole Langous- 
tine 
Sea bass Hake John Dory Squid 
Constant -.031*** -.036*** -.003*** -.003*** -.039*** -.154*** .004*** -.072*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Coast effect : Mediterranean  .294*** .346*** .020*** .736*** .212*** .549*** -.037*** .411*** 
 (.000) (.001) (.001) (.008) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
Fish species Sole -.014***        
(ref : Monkfish) (.001)        
  Langoustine .030***        
 (.001)        
  Sea bass -.023***        
 (.001)        
  Hake -.052***        
 (.001)        
  John Dory .002***        
 (.001)        
  Squid -.021***        
 (.001)        
Number of fish markets 222 33 37 17 37 31 32 35 
R² .297 .708 .005 .077 .452 .529 .009 .483 
Source: RIC 2007. 
Note: linear specification estimated by weighted least squares where the weight is the number of transactions in the market. Standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels being 
respectively 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
